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ABSTRACT 
In a pilot study, we employed a series of novel economic games to investigate the 
underexplored behavioral aspects of security investment decisions and security 
investment structure decisions (i.e., budgeting the security expenditure among different 
types of security measures). In our study, decision makers exhibited a bias toward 
investing in prevention even though investing in detection and response yielded the 
same return on security investment. We also demonstrated that it is difficult for human 
decision makers to determine the optimal security investment amount even when return 
on investment is readily calculable. Nearly all participants invested in security when the 
risk was so small that the economically justifiable security investment amount was zero.  
Keywords: Information Security, security investment, prevention, detection  
 
INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
As we rely more on information systems, security incidents are becoming more and more 
frequent and costly. To mitigate risk, both individuals and organizations invest money to acquire 
security measures. Similar to any other investment, the amount of investment in security may be 
inadequate, adequate, or even in excess with respect to the context. Although analytical methods 
can help decision making in the domain of security investment, individuals’ (subjective) 
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decisions play a key role in this area. Despite the prominent role that subjective opinions play in 
security decisions, the behavioral aspects of security investment have been largely ignored by the 
literature.  
Apart from the total amount of security investment, the “security investment structure”, 
or the way the security budget pie is divided, can also greatly impact the effectiveness of a 
security solution (Cavusoglu, Mishra, & Raghunathan, 2004). Two major areas of security 
investment are “prevention” and “detection and response” (a.k.a., “correction”). As it turns out, 
finding the right structure, or mix, of these types of security measures is very challenging in 
practice. For example, a recent study based on 20 years of data has shown that security decision 
makers in companies have long overspent on prevention technologies and underspent on 
detection and response technologies (Gartner Security & Risk Management Summit, 2014). The 
observed deviations from the optimal security investment structure may partly be explainable 
using behavioral decision theories, as research performed over the past few decades has provided 
solid evidence that behavioral factors play a prominent role in assessing, perceiving, and 
mitigating risk (Slovic, 2010).  
In our study, we developed an experiment that involves a series of novel economic 
games. We use this experiment to evaluate subjects’ investment decisions in security and 
compare it to the “correct,” optimal invest amount to determine the optimality of security 
investment decisions. Our experiment allows participant to invest in preventative security 
measures, in detective security measures, or in a mixture of the two. The experiment is designed 
in a way that yields the exact same level of return on security investment for either type of 
measure or for a mix of them. This allows us to establish empirically whether individuals are 
inherently biased toward prevention, as the real world investment data seem to show. 
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Our study is concerned with security investment decisions made at the individual level. Home 
users as well as many organizational users make their security investment decisions 
autonomously. Nevertheless, we must acknowledge that security investment decisions at the 
organizational level are typically transcend individuals. But even those decisions are formed by 
individuals, which makes the study of individual-level decisions valuable for understanding 
organizational-level decisions as well (Beebe, Young, & Chang, 2014).  
SECURITY RISK, ITS MEASUREMENTS, AND SECURITY INVESTMENT 
Traditional risk or decision analysis models are the most widely used methods to find 
optimal investment values. These methods are primarily based on their expected value (EV) 
(Gordon & Loeb, 2002; Hoo, 2000). The use of EV in security investment can be traced back to 
19791. This method calculates the total cost of security by identifying the major areas of 
vulnerability, the likelihood of incidents in those areas, and their costs. A fundamental 
assumption of IS security investment models based on EV is that decision makers are indifferent 
between scenarios that lead to the same expected values (Gordon & Loeb, 2002). This 
assumption, however, is frequently violated in everyday decision making (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1986). Our aim is to demonstrate the existence of these biases in the domain of information 
security investment.  
HYPOTHESES 
Security risk has two cost components of two different types: an expected cost of security 
incidents themselves and an immediate cost that companies incur by acquiring security measures. 
Owners of information systems make decisions about investing monetary resources (incurring a 
sure loss) to lower the expected, risky cost component. Prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 
                                                             
1 National Bureau of Standards, Guideline for Automatic Data Processing Risk Analysis, FIPS PUB 65 
(Washington, DC: U.S. General Printing Office, 1979). 
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1986) can help us analyze decisions made in risky situations such as this. According to this 
theory, the process of decision making under risk starts with an editing phase during which 
prospects are coded as either gains or losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). We propose that 
presenting security as either prevention or detection can affect the outcome of this phase and 
consequently result in different security investment decision outcomes. Prevention is a “pre-
event” or a “prognostic” activity. Detection is “post-event” or a “diagnostic” activity; it is about 
finding out about something bad that has happened (e.g., a server that has been compromised). 
Accordingly, when thinking about detection, subjects already envision themselves in the domain 
of losses. Kahneman and Tversky (1984) have shown that decision makers are more risk-seeking 
when losses are made salient. We propose that when deciding on how much to spend on 
detection, decision makers opt for taking more risk (e.g., less investment in security) compared 
to when they make decisions about prevention. Accordingly we propose that subjects have a 
higher propensity to spend on prevention than on detection 
H1: When given a chance to buy a mix of prevention and detection, preventative measures 
take up a larger share of the total security expenditure. 
The typical person is risk averse for gains. That is why people usually spend more than the 
expected cost of incidents to buy insurance, as insurance is framed as a gain and as a socially 
responsible and desirable behavior by insurance companies. To determine how much one should 
spend on insurance, one can use the expected loss from incidents as the reference point. For 
example, if the expected loss is estimated to be $10,000, then an average person should be 
willing to pay some amount more than this expected loss as an insurance premium. 
Counterintuitively, the maximum amount one should pay to buy security measures (i.e., to self-
insure) is in most cases just a fraction of the expected amount of loss due to incidents. For two 
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broad classes of information security breach probability functions, this amount has been shown 
to be less than 37% of the expected loss due to incidents (Gordon & Loeb, 2002). Accordingly 
we hypothesize that: 
H2-A: In general, subjects tend to invest more than the optimal investment amount to guard 
against threats.  
H2-B: Subjects tend to invest in security even in situations in which the risk of incidents is 
very low, and thus does not economically warrant any security investment.  
THE EXPERIMENT 
To study our hypotheses we designed an experiment comprised of three novel one-period 
economic security games. Twenty-one undergraduate business students participated in the pilot 
study for course credit and monetary reward. Participants used laptop computers to browse to a 
website developed for this study by the experimenters. Subjects were told that they could earn up 
to $20 in cash based on the optimality of their security investment decisions. The experiment was 
comprised of three sections. In all three sections subjects were told that their job was to protect a 
certain dataset with a known value of $10,000 that was subject to security incidents with a 
known chance of occurrence. In Section 1 (prevention-only game), subjects could reduce the 
chance of losing their data by half for every $1,000 that they spent on a preventative measure. In 
Section 2 (detection-only game), subjects could reduce the chance of losing their data by half for 
every $1,000 that they spent on a detective measure. Finally, in Section 3 (prevention and 
detection game), subjects could use either or both methods to reduce the chance of losing data. 
Sections 1 and 2 had six security scenarios each with different chances of incidents occurring 
and Section 3 had eight security scenarios. As explained earlier, the game is designed in a way 
that yields the exact same expected return on security investment irrespective of the investment 
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structure. Participants could input different investment amounts and then use a “risk calculator” 
to see the resulting risk level before submitting their answers. Therefore, subjects could readily 
see the (expected) effect of their investment.  The order of sections was counter-balanced.  
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
We matched and compared subjects’ answers to equivalent questions from Section 1 and 
Section 2. The McNemar's exact test statistic for paired proportions does not show any 
significant difference between security investments. We also conducted a paired-sample t-test 
between answers in Section 1 and corresponding answers in Section 2 but the difference was not 
statistically significant (t(124) =0.64, P = 0.52). We used the answers in Section 3 to test H1. We 
conducted a paired-sample t-test between investment amount in prevention and investment 
amount in detection in every scenario. There was a significant difference between investment in 
prevention (mean: $1,994, SD: $1,477) and investment in detection (M: $1,412, SD: $1,177); 
t(167)=4.053, P < .001, indicating that participants favored prevention over detection when both 
investment options were available. In an overwhelmingly large number of cases (84%) 
individuals invested in excess of the optimal amount. Participants spent, on average, $1,347 
(SD=$1,948) more than the optional amount, which was significantly different from zero 
(t(422)=14.15, P < .001), supporting H2-A. More surprisingly, subjects invested in 95% of the 
scenarios in which risk was so small that the optimal investment amount was zero, supporting 
H2-B.  
DISCUSSION 
Organizations are increasingly becoming aware of the fact that security is no longer an IT 
issue but rather is an enterprise-level risk issue. Accordingly, investing in security is becoming 
increasingly important and complicated. Improving these decisions would not be possible 
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without developing a deep understanding of the possible behavioral factors that may affect 
security investment and budgeting decisions. In this paper we used a series of novel economic 
games to study security investment decisions from a behavioral decision making perspective. In 
a controlled laboratory setting we were able to demonstrate that given the same return on 
security investment, decision makers exhibit a tendency, or a bias, toward spending on 
prevention rather than detection when given the option. We also demonstrated that it is difficult 
for human decision makers to determine the optimal security investment value even when return 
on security investment is readily calculable. Participants in our experiment heavily overinvested 
in security measures in magnitudes that cannot be attributable to risk aversion alone. In fact, 
nearly all of our participants invested money in security when the risk was so small that the 
economically justifiable security investment amount was zero. Overall, our results provide 
preliminary yet striking evidence that such biases play a significant role in security investment 
decisions. These preliminary results warrant conducting future research using a larger number of 
participants as well user users with different levels of wok experience to explore the robustness 
of this behavioral bias. We believe this is an underexplored area that merits substantial amounts 
of further research. 
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